There is a established stereotype that portrays the Russian people as an undivided whole. However, the Russian population, characterized by a boundless diversity of local features, can be divided into two large groups – Southerners and Northerners. In the 1920s, the outstanding Russian ethnographer Dmitry Zelenin suggested that there are two close, yet different, Russian nationalities: North Russians (pronouncing unstressed “o” as “o” rather than “a”) and South Russians (pronouncing unstressed “o” as “a”). In accordance with his theory, Zelenin proposed dividing Eastern Slavs into Ukrainians, Belarusians, North Russians and South Russians.
Russia’s North and South have retained their basic distinctions to this day. At various historical stages, the North and the South have repeatedly manifested their discrepancy and even certain opposition. Recently, the consequences of this little-known phenomenon told on the country’s real politics. Among the factors that worked against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was his ineradicable South Russian identity and strong accent.
Russians emerged as a nation after Slavs assimilated the Ugro-Finnic tribes and other nationalities that the Slavs had come into contact with as they settled. The zone itself was divided into two sub-zones – the vast forests and steppes of the landmass. Correspondingly, ethnogenic flows became divided, as well. The mutual assimilation of Slavs and Ugro-Finns produced the population of the forest sub-zone, which was engaged mostly in farming. On the other hand, the South Russian steppe came to be populated by nomads who often attacked the farmers. The advance into the steppe tore the Russians away from their native landscape and submerged them into a basically new world. In the South, there eventually formed an ethnos that became an organic part of the forest-steppe zone. The assimilation of the South Russian Slavs with numerous steppe tribes continued for centuries and resulted in an independent ethnic whole which was perfectly adapted to life in the southern steppe and capable of confronting any natural nomad.
The distinctions between the North and the South are diverse. Apart from the striking difference of the dialects, they differ in everyday culture, cuisine, rites and folk songs. The North and South Russians differ in their anthropologic type, temperament, communication style and ways they engage in economic activities. Another major difference lies in their social system. For example, the Cossacks of South Russia preserved their main institution of military democracy – the Military Assembly – until the Civil War (1918-1920), while in the North it ceased to exist in the 13th-14th centuries. Finally, there is a clear distinction between the North Russian and South Russian mentalities. The South has preserved the ethnos of a military democracy. For a Cossack, a man stands for a soldier, and war comes as an initiation rite and sacral testing. All these factors help shape a special character and self-consciousness.
For centuries, the North and the South had dramatic relations with each other. The Time of Troubles (the early 1600s) was the most glaring episode of the domination of the South over the North, an episode which was traumatic for the historical consciousness. The North scored a very difficult victory over the uncontrolled South (Cossacks) who were a source of mortal fear. Then, the 1917 Bolshevik revolution triggered a civil war in Russia. The South again emerged at the forefront and for a short period of time determined Russia’s destiny. The Southern (Cossack) lands became the domain of the anti-Bolshevik White Movement. A close look at Civil War maps shows that the Whites won victories within the territory of the Cossacks’ former Dikoye Pole (Wild Field), but whenever they crossed the boundaries of the former Moscow Principality they suffered a defeat. The Cossacks and the other population of the South habitually took sides with the forces that opposed the center (the North) and that promised to preserve their traditional autonomy.
The problem of the two sub-ethnoses of the Russian people is a taboo subject which is concealed in the subconsciousness of Russian culture. Meanwhile, the heterogeneity of North and South Russia is a reality. When former factors of integration decay and the state is experiencing a crisis, historically preceding structures become more active. In such a situation, the dissimilarity of the South and the North becomes an important factor.
The problem of the two sub-ethnoses of the Russian people is a taboo subject which is concealed in the subconsciousness of Russian culture. Meanwhile, the heterogeneity of North and South Russia is a reality. When former factors of integration decay and the state is experiencing a crisis, historically preceding structures become more active. In such a situation, the dissimilarity of the South and the North becomes an important factor.
INTERCONTINENTAL BREAK
Another internal boundary within Russia is intercontinental by nature. Russia is a Eurasian state, and the boundary between the two continents of Europe and Asia travels the length of the Urals down to the Caspian Sea. Russia’s geographical position gave rise to the idea of “Eurasianship.” Piles of documents have been written about Russia’s “special Eurasian mission” and numerous “advantages” of its Eurasian status. Yet, the Russian Federation is not the only Eurasian state in history. Let’s have a look at how other such states developed.
The ancient Persians tried to build a Eurasian empire but their military defeat against the Greeks (480-449 BC) buried the first Eurasian project. It was
implemented later (333-323 BC) by Alexander the Great, but his sprawling empire began to fragment already in his lifetime. After his death in 323 BC, the empire, which did not last longer than ten years, broke up into African, Asian and European fragments.
The Roman Empire was one more Eurasian state. It existed for several centuries until it was divided into two parts in 395 AD. The farther it expanded into Asia and Africa, the more wars and problems it faced on its outskirts, and thus the less stable it became. In the long run, the empire fell into decline and broke up.
This is a hypothetical scenario, but should one wish to elaborate, such a breakup may presuppose the separation of Siberia and the Far East, as well as territories gravitating toward the Baltic region (the St. Petersburg and Novgorod areas), as well as South Russia. A complete disintegration of the Russian Federation may entail the separation of the constituent republics in the Volga Region. With the modernization period over, it is highly probable that the former constituent entities of the Russian Federation, or at least some of them, will re-integrate into a new Russian state.
The most hopeless group comprises those territories that were included in the Soviet Union after World War II. These territories have no Russian roots, reminiscences or historical inertia, while the degree of their development remains minimal. External disintegrative pressures on these territories are maximal. The loss of the Kuril Islands and Eastern Prussia, for example, may take place already in the medium term.
Then there are the territories that have been part of Russia for over a century. These are the Islamic North Caucasus, as well as those regions that are gravitating toward the Buddhist cultural realm – Tuva, Buryatia and, perhaps, Kalmykia. However, the probability of these territories’ separation is different, and is high with part of the North Caucasus and much lower for the territories in the Buddhist cultural realm.
The last territories in the list of likely “defectors” are the constituent republics in the Volga Region – Bashkortostan and Tatarstan. The probability of their separation is infinitesimal. The integration of these republics into Russia’s space is so high that their separation can be imagined only if the Russian Federation breaks up completely. Nevertheless, the region is pursuing a strategic line toward still more autonomy. The logic of actions taken by the political elites of the Volga Region republics can lead to Russia’s confederalization.
miércoles, 30 de enero de 2013
Suscribirse a:
Enviar comentarios (Atom)
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario